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Housing capital has tax advantages over other types of capitals in the United States. This 
paper studies the long run effects of eliminating the favorable tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing in a two-period OLG model with exogenous and endogenous fertility 
choice respectively. Numerical results show that taxing the imputed rents fully increases 
nonresidential capital stock but lowers the housing stock in either exogenous or 
endogenous fertility model. In the meantime, general goods consumption increases but 
housing services decreases in both periods. Fertility declines when first period housing 
services is at the minimum requirement level. Furthermore, welfare declines in the 
exogenous fertility model, but it improves in the endogenous fertility model when 
housing services in both periods is at the lowest level. The revenue equivalent welfare 
analysis also shows that equal tax rates on two types of capital are not optimal. Taxing 
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It has long been understood that housing plays a crucial role in the aggregate economy 
and household behaviors. The favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in the 
United States has been extensively debated in the literature. Housing capital has tax 
advantages relative to other types of capital in the United States. The two main sources of 
advantages are: imputed rents provided by owner-occupied housing are not taxed; 
mortgage interest payments are excluded from the taxable income. Efficiency issues 
incurred on favorable tax treatment are of great interests to economists. For example, 
early work is done in Rosen (1979), in which the excess burden and distributional 
consequences of implicitly subsidizing owner-occupied housing is examined. Skinner 
(1996) quantifies the efficiency cost of preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing. He found that the dynamic efficiency cost of not taxing housing is as much as 
2.2% of GNP in 1990. Furthermore, some authors have considered the housing tax on 
capital accumulation and economic growth.  Gahvari (1984, 1985) studies the long-run 
effects of differential taxes and investigated the optimal tax rates on residential and 
nonresidential capital. Turnovsky and Okuyama (1994) analyze both the dynamic and 
long run responses of capital accumulation to a change in the housing tax through the 
introduction of housing as the second sector. More recently, Gervais (2002) studies the 
welfare effects in a life-cycle model with down-payment constraints and mortgage 
interest deductibility. Brito and Pereira (2002) introduce human capital as a third type of 
capital and showed the effects of productivity shocks on growth through their effects on 
the relative asset prices and the corresponding changes in capital intensity.  
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    However, none of the above studies considers the fertility choice endogenously 
determined by households. Population growth is exogenously fixed or ignored in the 
literature about housing. One rare exception that considers endogenous fertility in the 
literature related to housing is Eckstein and Wolpin (1985). In that paper, they 
demonstrate the optimal population size in an overlapping generation model with a 
financial asset and a non-depreciable asset (e.g. land). But no issues of taxation or other 
public policies are discussed. In fact, housing decisions are closely related to the demand 
for children. For most individuals, housing purchases are the single largest expenditures. 
Housing investment constitutes the most fundamental asset. To decide how much housing 
services to consume, individuals need to consider how many people will live in the house. 
To have more children, more housing services should be provided to keep the basic living 
standard.  
On the other hand, in the economic analysis of fertility, more attention is paid to the 
tradeoff between the quantity and quality of children (e.g. Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 
(1990)), while the role of housing is ignored despite that housing service is also a big 
component of the household consumption bundle. The cost of housing has to be taken 
into consideration when parents choose the number of children. The purchases of housing 
services are a large component of the cost of children. Parents have to provide more 
housing service when they have more children.  
Figure 1 shows the fertility rates of 20 OECD countries during the year 1981-2008, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, 
Germany, Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Netherland, Belgium, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Japan. It is indicated that the United 
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States has a higher average fertility rate than many other OECD countries besides New 
Zealand. Another observation is that some developed countries do not allow a home 
mortgage interest deduction and do not tax imputed rents either, including Canada, 
Australia, France, Germany and Japan. Some other countries like Netherland, Sweden 
and Switzerland allow such a deduction but they also tax imputed rents. The United 
Kingdom and the United States have preferential treatment on both mortgage interest 
payments and imputed income from rents. However, Mann (2000) estimates that the 
maximum subsidy Britain provides for home ownership is a third less than the average 
mortgage interest deduction taken by a U.S. taxpayer. By contrast, U.S. has a more 
generous favorable tax provision of owner-occupied housing. Whether the higher fertility 
rate in the U.S. can be partly attributed to its tax advantages of housing motivates the 
present research.  
Figure 1: The fertility rates of some OECD countries during 1981-2008 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2009, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New 
York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.     



































    In the present paper, I develop a two-period overlapping generation model with 
housing, fertility and bequests. I also consider taxes on residential capital income and 
nonresidential capital income. This is intended to capture the level of fertility 
endogenously determined by the household so as to see the long-term responses of capital 
stocks, fertility and welfare to the changes in tax policies. In developing this growth 
model, I combine together two streams of the economics literature. On one hand, I follow 
the framework of an OLG model in Gahvari (1984), taking housing as both consumption 
and investment goods, which can generate housing services as well as serve as 
investment mechanism. On the other hand, I follow the steps of the economic theory of 
fertility pioneered by Becker (1960) whereby children are viewed as a durable 
consumption good that provide utility compared with that from other goods via the utility 
function. Fertility is determined by income, costs of children, and tastes for children.  
In Gahvari (1984), it is demonstrated that raising the tax rate in the residential sector 
would increase the steady-state capital intensity in the nonresidential sector but lower the 
long-run stock of housing capital. Throughout my paper, by contrast, I try to answer the 
following questions: will the results derived from the exogenous fertility model in 
Gahvari (1984) still hold when endogenous fertility and bequests are introduced? How 
the optimal fertility is determined especially when the choice of fertility is made jointly 
with decisions about housing and general goods consumption, the accumulation of two 
types of capital and intergenerational transfers? What is the effect of differential tax 
policies on the steady state capital stock, fertility and welfare?   
Some results are found to answer the questions above. Although introducing the 
endogenous fertility and bequests, the effects of eliminating favorable tax treatment of 
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housing on the steady state capital accumulation, consumption and housing services are 
the same as those in Gahvari(1984) with exogenous fertility. Removing the preferential 
tax treatment of housing increases capital per worker in the nonresidential sector but 
discourages the accumulation of housing capital, which in further increases the 
consumption goods but lowers the housing services consumed in both periods. The 
fertility decision particularly depends on the connection between the amount of housing 
services consumed and the minimum housing services required. In the cases that housing 
services is at the minimum level in the first period, fertility is negatively related to the tax 
rate on residential capital income. Otherwise, in the other cases that housing services 
exceeds the minimum level, fertility is positively related to the tax rate on residential 
capital income. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the models, separated 
into exogenous and endogenous fertility models. Section 3 shows numerical results and a 
discussion of the results. Section 4 provides the conclusion. 
2. The model 
There are two types of capital in this economy, residential and nonresidential capital. The 
housing capital plays a dual role for households, providing a flow of housing services and 
serving as an investment mechanism. Taxes on two types of assets are different. Housing 
asset has tax advantages over other assets: the service income provided by owner 
occupied housing (imputed rent) is not taxed; mortgage interest payments are deductible 
from taxable income. In effect, the preferential tax system can be viewed as implicitly 
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subsidizing owner occupied housing. Fullerton (1987) estimates that the effective tax rate 
on owner occupied housing is 19 percent while it is 36 percent on non-housing assets.  
The economy produces general consumption goods, as well as housing services. The 
general output can be used in consumption in the same period, or saved as investment 
goods, used in the next period production in both residential and nonresidential sectors. 
Both types of capital are assumed to depreciate at the same rate        . All houses are 
assumed to be residential and owner-occupied so that houses for nonresidential purpose 
and rental housing are not considered. Otherwise, the housing tenure choice has to be 
addressed which makes the modeling more complicate. The relevant research has been 
done in much theoretical tenure choice literature (for example, see Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983) and Brueckner (1986)). Given the asymmetric treatment of taxation on 
housing, the imputed rents to house owners are tax exempt while the rental income of the 
landlords is taxable. As a result, the cost of the renting is higher than that of owning. An 
extension can be made to see the impact of housing tenure decision on the household 
fertility choice, while the present paper concentrates on the owner-occupied housing. 
    General consumption goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas production 
technology 
              
       
   ,           
where     is a productivity parameter,         is the capital share in the output,    is 
the aggregate stock of nonresidential capital,    is the total number of workers, and    is 
the working hours devoted by each worker. The general output    can be used as general 
consumption goods in the same period, or saved as nonresidential capital      and 
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residential capital      in the next period production. The prices of both types of 
investment goods will be identical to the price of the general consumption good, which is 
normalized at unity. 
    As for the housing sector, it is argued that only service flows generate utility in the 
durable goods literature. A common setting is that service flows from the durables are 
proportional to the durable stock held. See for example Mankiw (1982) and Chah et al 
(1995).  Hence, the aggregate housing services     are assumed to be proportional to the 
aggregate housing stock   .  
              .        
where         is the ratio of housing capital input and the housing services produced.  
The profit in the housing sector can be expressed as 
          
          
   ,  
where   
  is the rate of return to residential capital income. 
As profit maximization is assumed, the rate of return to residential capital is 
          
    
    
   
    .       
The value of   will not affect the results. Hence, for simplicity,   is set equal to one in 
the rest of the paper. This illustrates the equalization between the rate of return to 
residential capital income and the price of housing service. The assumption of unit 




2.1 Exogenous fertility 
The economy consists of overlapping generations of identical agents. Each individual 
lives for two periods, and only works in the first period. The fertility rate is exogenously 
set to be       , then the size of each working generation is         .  
    Individuals enjoy general consumption goods as well as housing services. The 
preference of an individual is represented by 
                                               ,                                                     (1)              
where              represent general goods consumption and housing service in the 
young age, while                  represent those in the old age, respectively.         
is the time discount factor,               control the ratio of expenditures on 
housing to total non-housing expenditures.  
    All resources, including nonresidential capital and residential capital, are owned by the 
old. The young are employed by the old and receive a wage of    in terms of 
consumption goods in period  . Each young individual supplies 1 unit of labor input into 
the general production, i.e.     . Assume that all factor markets are perfectly 
competitive. Firms pursue profit maximization in both sectors, so the wage rate and the 
rental price of nonresidential capital are 
                  
 ,                                                                                                       (2) 
               
   ,                                                                                                               (3) 
where    
  
  
  is the nonresidential capital per worker. 
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    All savings are made by individuals in the first period to maximize their lifetime 
utilities. Young agents save    for residential capital and    
  for nonresidential capital in 
the period  . Therefore, the budget constraints of the representative individual born in 
period   are  
                             
     ,                                                                        (4) 
                                
             
     
       ,                                    (5) 
where     
               ,     
        
          represent the after-tax net 
rate of return to nonresidential and residential capital income respectively,    is the price 
of housing services in the first period,   is the tax rate on nonresidential capital income,   
is the tax rate on residential capital income,      is the lump-sum compensation from the 
government to the old generation. The tax rate on housing is not necessarily greater than 
zero. As in the U.S., the imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing is untaxed, 
i.e.    . Also, when    ,  it means a subsidy to housing capital, such as the tax 
deductibility of mortgage interest.   
    All tax revenue is assumed to be rebated in a lump-sum transfer. The government is 
assumed to balance its budget in every period. Thus, the government budget constraint is  
                           
        
 .                                                                         (6) 
Equilibrium conditions are 
                           , 
          
                  ,  
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where       is the average level of nonresidential capital investment per person in the 
economy,       is the average level of residential capital investment per person in the 
economy. 
Furthermore, market clears in the residential sector such that 
                               .  
The household’s maximization problem satisfies the following two conditions. 
        
   
   
                                 ,                                                  (7) 
        
   
   
                      
            ,                                                  (8) 
where       
   
    
 and       
   
      
 are the marginal utility of young age and old age 
general goods consumption respectively. 
Equations (7) and (8) yield a relationship between the after-tax rates of return to capitals 
in the two sectors 
                           
         .                                                                    (9)   
Equation (9) means that the after-tax net rate of return to capital is equal across two 
sectors to rule out arbitrage opportunities. This also links the price of housing service 
with rates of return to housing and non-housing capital. 
             
  
           
   
  .                                                                                         (10)  
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Equation (10) says that given the rate of return to nonresidential capital income, the price 
of housing service is positively related to the tax on housing capital income, but 
negatively related to the tax on non-housing capital income.  
Putting Eq. (9) into (4) and (5), the individual’s lifetime budget constraint is written as 
                        
                
           
    
    
           
.                                    (11) 
The representative Individual chooses    ,      ,     , and        to maximize his utility 
and subject to the Eq. (11). The first order necessary conditions are 
        
     
     
 
 
               
,                                                                                               (12) 
        
     
     
        ,                                                                                                      (13) 
        
     
     
     ,                                                                                                               (14) 
where       
   
     
,       
   
       
 are the marginal utility of young age and old age 
housing services respectively.  
Equation (12) means the marginal rate of substitution between young age consumption 
and old age consumption is equal to the after-tax return of saving residential capital. 
Equations (13) and (14) determine the allocation of expenditures between the general 
goods consumption and housing services in the corresponding period.   
   The steady-state solution is characterized by time-invariant quantities 
                    and prices     
    . Combining Eqs. (13) and (14), and using the 
equalization condition (9), we have 
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.                                                         (15) 
Equation (15) means the marginal rate of substitution between two periods’ housing 
services is equal to the gross after tax rate of return to residential asset multiplied by the 
size of the family.  
    Using first order conditions (12)-(14), the consumer’s budget constraints (4) and (5), 
the government budget constraint (6) and the market clearing condition, and substituting 
  and    with   through equations (9) and (10), we have 
           
        
          
                 
          
         
           




 ,                                  (16) 
Optimal conditions (12)-(14) become  
                
    ,                                                                                                     (17) 
            
    
      
,                                                                                                             (18) 
            
      
    
 
.                                                                                                        (19)  
Putting Eqs. (16) - (19), factor prices and Eq (10)into the budget constraints, we can solve 
for the steady state capital intensity   so that the whole system can be derived.   
2.2 Endogenous fertility 
The model in this section follows the above one except that fertility    is endogenously 
determined by each young individual and altruistic bequest      is given by the old. The 
size of each working generation in period  , is          . In order to investigate the 
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impact on fertility, the minimum housing service per person is assumed to be  , which 
requires the smallest amount of housing service per person consumed.  
    Besides general consumption goods and housing services, individuals enjoy the 
satisfaction from having children and leaving bequests. The preference is represented by 
                                                            ,                     (1’)              
where         have the same meanings as ones in section 2.1,             are the 
tastes for the number of children and for the bequests left to each of them.  
    Individuals choose the number of children in the first period. Each parent spends ν 
units of time in rearing each child, and devotes the remaining        units of time in 
working, i.e.         . So the wage rate and the rental price in the nonresidential 
sector become 
                  
 ,                                                                                                      (2’) 
               
   ,                                                                                                              (3’) 
where    
  
         
 is the effective capital-labor ratio. There is no change in the housing 
services production sector.  
    In the first period, children live with their parents. More housing services should be 
provided for more numbers of children. Hence, housing services provided for children 
becomes one part of the cost of children. Children leave home and have their own 
families when they grow up. Therefore, in the second period, old-aged agents live alone 
14 
 
and consider the housing services for their own use only. The budget constraints of the 
representative individual born in period   are  
                              
              ,                                              (4’) 
                                
            
     
                                   (5’)                  
    It is assumed that the minimum requirement for housing service per person is  , thus 
the housing constraint is  
                        .                                                                                              (20) 
The constraint is set to prevent the living space from being overcrowded. Individuals 
cannot always increase the number of children by squeezing the living size per person.  
Equation (13) still holds in this model, so the lifetime budget constraint is  
                         
                
               
              
           
               
.   (11’) 
The first order necessary conditions from the household’s maximization problem are 
        
     
     
 
 
               
,                                                                                              (12’) 
        
     
     
         ,                                                                                                   (13’) 
        
     
     
     ,                                                                                                              (14’) 
        
     
     
     
    
               
       ,                                                                     (21) 
        
     
     
   ,                                                                                                                   (22) 
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where       
   
   
,       
   
     
 are the marginal utility of the number of children and 
bequests respectively,                         are defined in the section 2.1.  
Equation (13’) (or (14’)) means the marginal rate of substitution between young age (or 
old age) housing services and young age (or old age) general goods consumption is no 
less than the expenditures on per unit of housing service (relative price in terms of the 
consumption good). The equality holds when young age (or old age) housing service 
consumed is strictly greater than  . 
Equation (21) means that utility forgone from consuming less to have one more child is 
equal to the utility gained from the satisfaction of having the child. The marginal cost of 
have an additional child consists of three components: the forgone wage income of 
spending time on parental rearing, the bequest cost and the housing service cost.  
Equation (22) means the marginal rate of substitution between bequests and old age 
consumption is equal to the number of children. Given the utility forgone from 
consuming in old age, bequest left to each child is negatively related to the number of 
children.  
    A competitive equilibrium of the economy for a given set of policy variables       is 
defined as a set of quantities                                   and a set of prices 
      
      that satisfy the following conditions. 
a) Household utility maximization 




b) Firms’ profit maximization given by Eqs. (2’), (3’) and (10) 
c) Government budget constraint  
                           
        
 ,                                                                                                                                                                          
d) Equilibrium conditions 
                           ,  
          
                  ,  
                                ,       
where     is the average level of fertility in the economy,       and       are the average 
nonresidential and residential capital stock per person in the economy. 
3. Numerical results 
The numerical results for the models are derived in this section. This requires preference 
parameters               , technology parameters        , and tax system      . The 
effects of tax changes will be reported separately and a summary of two models will be 
made below. 
    There are two periods for each individual in the model. Each period lasts for 30 years. 
It is assumed that young individuals are born at real-life age 21, having an expected age 
of death at 80. Thus, the first period starts from age 21 to 50, and the second period 
begins from age 51 to 80.  
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    The tax system in the benchmark model is a tax rate of 0.3 on the nonresidential capital 
income, and zero tax rate on the residential capital income. This is intended to replicate 
the U.S. economy, in which imputed rents in the residential sector is not taxed. The time 
discount factor   is assumed to be 0.5 and depreciation rate is 0.8, which are suitable 
values for a model with 30 years as one single period. A conventional value       is 
selected for the capital’s share. 
3.1 Exogenous fertility 
The productivity parameter A is set at 3. I follow Skinner (1996) in choosing the 
preference parameters for housing                  . The value used for the 
fertility is 1.015.  
3.1.1 Measure of steady state values and changes 
The steady state values under the benchmark system and alternative systems are shown in 
Table 1. I stress the changes in steady state values when the favorable tax treatment of 
housing capital is eliminated, which are separated into two cases: partial elimination   
          , and full elimination         . The other alternatives that zero tax rates 
on two capitals, differential tax rates (the tax rate on housing capital exceeds the one on 
industrial capital, i.e.           and            ) are calculated to compare with 
the benchmark model. Table 2 demonstrates the percentage changes in steady-state 
capital intensity, housing stock, general goods consumption and welfare under alternative 
tax systems relative to the benchmark tax system. 
In both cases of elimination, the general goods consumption increases, while the 
housing services declines. This is caused by the rise in the price of housing services. As 
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the tax rate on housing capital income increases from 0 to 0.3, the price of housing 
service increases by 18.81%.  A higher price of housing causes a substitution effect 
between housing services and general goods consumption. Consumers switch to buy 
more general goods as housing services become more expensive relative to the other 
goods. This in turn brings about a higher stock of nonresidential capital and a lower stock 
of housing capital. As far as factor prices are concerned, the increment of capital intensity 
in the industrial sector results in an increase in the wage rate but a reduction in the  
Table 1: Steady state values                                    
 Benchmark     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  0.297 0.378 0.394 0.342 0.307 0.312 
  0.277 0.282 0.242 0.241 0.254 0.240 
   0.768 0.799 0.829 0.812 0.788 0.799 
   0.735 0.790 0.799 0.766 0.741 0.745 
    0.065 0.065 0.056 0.056 0.060 0.057 
    0.149 0.155 0.131 0.129 0.136 0.127 
  1.712 1.779 2.126 2.067 1.902 2.034 
  1.460 1.568 1.588 1.522 1.472 1.481 
  (%) 2.509 1.938 1.840 2.178 2.437 2.395 
welfare -1.543 -1.462 -1.488 -1.532 -1.554 -1.563 
Notes: (1) These calculations are based on the following parameters:                  
                                              
            (2)    represents the annual rate of return to nonresidential capital, which is converted through 
                        
 
    .  
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     Table 2: Percentage changes in steady state values  
     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  27.27 32.66 15.15 3.37 5.05 
  1.81 -12.64 -12.99 -8.30 -13.36 
   4.04 7.94 5.73 2.60 4.04 
   7.48 8.71 4.22 0.82 1.36 
    0 -13.85 -13.85 -7.69 -12.31 
    4.03 -12.08 -13.42 -8.72 -14.77 
Welfare 
change 
5.25 3.56 0.71 -0.71 -1.30 
 
interest rate. Table 2 shows that taxing imputed rents fully would increase capital 
intensity by 5.05%, reduce housing stock by 13.36%, and raise general goods 
consumption by 4.04% in young age and 1.36% in old age. In the case of partial 
elimination, the corresponding change rates are less than the full elimination case. The 
welfare changes departing from the benchmark are -1.3% in the full elimination and -0.71% 
in the partial elimination.  
The effects of taxes on capital stock are in line with Gervais (2002) when tenure choice 
and a down-payment requirement are also introduced to a life-cycle model. He finds that 
taxing imputed rents at the same rates as business capital increase the stock of business 
capital while decreasing the housing capital stock in the long run suggesting that the 
preferential tax treatment of housing assets causes housing to crowd out other assets.  
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3.1.2 Welfare effects 
The effects of capital income tax on the welfare are shown in the figure 2 and 3. 
Increasing tax rate on either residential or nonresidential capital income would reduce the 
welfare. Table 3 and 4 report the results about how the steady state revenue equivalent 
welfare changes to the different tax rates of two capitals. Tax revenues are kept constant 
at the benchmark level in both tables. Tax rates on residential and nonresidential capital 
income are varied respectively to see the impacts of welfare. It is found that equal tax 
rates cannot achieve the optimality. Differential tax rates can reach higher steady state 
welfare than equal tax rates           . Welfare is higher when the tax rate on 
residential capital exceeds that on nonresidential capital. The extreme case is that the 
welfare when tax revenue is fully financed by the residential capital income tax is much 
higher than fully financed by the nonresidential capital income tax. Subsidies on 
residential capital lead to a lower welfare level related to the benchmark model. 
     Table 3: Revenue equivalent welfare changes in alternative policies 
     
    
    
        
      
        
        
      
        














Table 4: Revenue equivalent welfare changes to differential tax rates 
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
              1.17             3.05 
              2.14               2.59 
              2.85               1.62 
               3.11                -2.53 
               2.79                -6.22 
 





















Tax rate on residential capital income
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3.2 The endogenous fertility model 
Additional parameterization is given as follows. Parameter   is set at 0.15, namely, the 
parental time spent on children accounts for 15%. The taste for the number of children 
and the taste for the bequest are assumed at 0.8 and 0.3. The minimum housing services 
level is assumed at 0.05.    represents the annual rate of return to nonresidential capital, 
which is converted by     
 
    . Tax rates in benchmark system are still at 0.3 of 
nonresidential capital income tax and zero tax rate on residential capital income. The 
other parameters are kept the same as those in the exogenous model.  
    There are four possible cases in the endogenous fertility model: housing service per 
person in young age is equal to  , but that in old age is greater than  ; housing service 
per person in young age is greater than   but that in old age is equal to  ; both of them 
are equal to  ; both of them are greater than  . We shall discuss these four possible cases 
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3.2.1 Measure of steady state values and changes 
We first investigate case 1 whereby       and      . Table 1a shows the steady 
state values in this case. Capital intensity in nonresidential sector goes up and housing 
stock declines as residential sector is taxed more heavily. This also gives rise to a 
decrease in the rate of return to nonresidential capital and an increase in the wage rate. 
When taxing housing capital income as much as non-housing capital income, in both 
periods, general goods consumption increases while housing services declines. This is 
caused by the increase of price of housing services which drives individuals to consume 
more general goods relative to housing services in both periods. 
A tax on the nonresidential capital income has a negative effect on both the capital 
intensity and the level of housing stock, and results in a lower wage rate but a higher rate 
of return to capital. A higher rate of return to nonresidential capital increases the price of 
future goods relative to that of the present. The substitution effect pushes individuals to 
do more consumption today rather than do tomorrow, and thus brings about a lower 









Table 1a: Steady state values when       and       
 Benchmark     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  0.449 0.536 0.544 0.490 0.454 0.457 
  0.245 0.249 0.235 0.233 0.237 0.232 
  1.267 1.242 1.229 1.244 1.259 1.254 
b 0.270 0.285 0.291 0.281 0.273 0.276 
   0.820 0.840 0.854 0.842 0.828 0.834 
   0.570 0.590 0.595 0.583 0.574 0.576 
    0.167 0.170 0.152 0.150 0.156 0.149 
  1.192 1.206 1.364 1.352 1.282 1.345 
  1.760 1.853 1.860 1.804 1.765 1.768 
    ) 1.029 0.625 0.595 0.834 1.007 0.992 
welfare -1.863 -1.818 -1.820 -1.846 -1.864 -1.864 
Notes: (1) These calculations are based on the following:                           
                                                             
Furthermore, we also consider the impacts of taxes on the fertility rate. Fertility 
declines when eliminating the preferential tax treatment of residential capital. See figure 
4, when   remains at zero, fertility declines as tax rate on residential capital income is 
higher. The change rate of fertility is -1.03% when removing fully the favorable tax 
provision of housing. This is caused by the increase in the cost of children. The three 
components of parental costs are shown in Eq. (21). As the tax rate on residential capital 
rises, industrial capital intensity increases so that the wage rate increases but the rate of 
return to nonresidential capital decreases correspondingly. The lower wage rate reduces 
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the cost of forgone wage income of having an additional child. The bequest cost increases 
with the imposition of a tax on residential capital income. The cost of housing services 
for having an additional child increases because of a higher price in housing service. 
Thus, children become more expensive related to consumption, which leads to a lower 
fertility rate. Bequest increases in response to the lower number of children. From Eq. 
(22), steady state bequest can be expressed as   
   
 
. As the tax rate on residential 
capital income increases, old age general goods consumption increases but fertility 
declines so that the bequest to each child increases. 
Figure 4: Changes of fertility to tax on residential capital income when       and 
      
 
 
In case 2, housing service per person in young age is greater than   but that in old age 
is equal to  . The impacts of taxes on the industrial capital intensity and housing capital 
stock are similar to case 1. See table 1b, as the tax rate on residential capital increases, 
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nonresidential capital increases, either capital intensity or housing capital stock goes 
down. In both periods, general goods consumption increases while housing services 
declines when removing favorable tax provision of residential capital income. Again, 
welfare reduces to a lower level when removing favorable tax provision.  
Table 1b: Steady state values when       and       
 Benchmark     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  0.482 0.572 0.575 0.519 0.484 0.486 
  0.260 0.265 0.242 0.239 0.246 0.238 
  1.121 1.099 1.107 1.121 1.126 1.129 
b 0.315 0.333 0.332 0.322 0.315 0.314 
   0.864 0.888 0.898 0.884 0.871 0.875 
   0.589 0.609 0.613 0.602 0.592 0.594 
    0.102 0.105 0.093 0.092 0.095 0.091 
  1.163 1.172 1.324 1.316 1.249 1.311 
  1.783 1.875 1.879 1.823 1.786 1.788 
    ) 0.925 0.532 0.516 0.750 0.914 0.906 
welfare -1.850 -1.797 -1.810 -1.840 -1.856 -1.861 
 
However, the effect of the residential capital income tax on fertility is different with 
case 1. There is a positive relationship between fertility and the tax rate on residential 
capital income in this case (see figure 5). The change rate of fertility is around 0.71% to 
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an imposition of a 3% tax rate on residential capital income, and bequest reduces in 
response to such an increase in fertility. 
Figure 5: Changes of fertility to tax on residential capital income when       and 
      
 
In case 3, both young age and old age housing services are equal to  . See table 1c, 
when eliminating preferential tax of housing, industrial capital intensity increases and 
housing capital stock declines. General goods consumption in both periods increases. 
Fertility drops by 1.80% when removing subsidies on residential capital in full. The 
negative relationship between fertility and tax rate on residential capital income is shown 
in figure 6. In contrast to the other cases, welfare level is higher than the benchmark level 
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Table 1c: Steady state values when           
 Benchmark     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  0.438 0.523 0.531 0.477 0.442 0.445 
  0.154 0.154 0.153 0.153 0.154 0.153 
  1.334 1.306 1.283 1.300 1.320 1.310 
         b 0.271 0.287 0.293 0.283 0.275 0.277 
   0.862 0.882 0.890 0.878 0.866 0.869 
   0.604 0.625 0.626 0.614 0.605 0.606 
  1.201 1.216 1.382 1.370 1.300 1.362 
  1.753 1.846 1.851 1.795 1.756 1.758 
    ) 1.061 0.654 0.631 0.874 1.046 1.035 
welfare -1.952 -1.912 -1.910 -1.933 -1.950 -1.950 
 
Figure 6: Changes of fertility to tax on nonresidential capital income when     
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Finally, we investigate case 4 in which both young age and old age housing services 
are above the minimum requirement of housing services. Changes of capital intensity and 
housing capital stock are the same as the above cases. General goods consumption 
increases and housing services declines in both periods. Fertility rises by 1.21% when 
subsidies on housing capital income are fully cancelled. Figure 7 shows a positive 
relationship between fertility and tax rate on residential capital income. Besides, welfare 
declines when two types of capital income are taxed equally.  
Table 1d: Steady state values when                 
 Benchmark     
    
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  0.502 0.592 0.595 0.539 0.503 0.505 
  0.367 0.378 0.340 0.334 0.345 0.331 
  1.071 1.051 1.064 1.076 1.079 1.084 
b 0.311 0.327 0.327 0.317 0.311 0.310 
   0.826 0.847 0.862 0.849 0.834 0.840 
   0.555 0.573 0.580 0.569 0.559 0.562 
    0.101 0.104 0.094 0.092 0.095 0.091 
    0.169 0.173 0.156 0.154 0.159 0.152 
  1.143 1.152 1.295 1.287 1.225 1.283 
  1.799 1.889 1.893 1.839 1.802 1.804 
    ) 0.854 0.473 0.457 0.683 0.842 0.834 




Figure 7: Changes of fertility to tax on nonresidential capital income when     




3.2.2 Welfare Effects 
We still begin with case 1 in this subsection. As shown in figure 8 and 9, the steady state 
welfare is negatively related to the tax on residential or nonresidential capital income, 
which is the same as the exogenous model.   
    Table 3a and 4a show welfare changes under alternative tax policies related to the 
benchmark model when tax revenue is fixed at the benchmark level. In line with the 
results in exogenous model, equal tax rates are not optimal since differential tax rates can 
achieve higher welfare. From the left side of table 4a, as the tax on residential capital and 
the subsidies on nonresidential capital increase, welfare rises to a higher level. On the 
contrary, from the right side of table 4a, welfare declines with a higher tax rate on 
nonresidential capital and a lower tax rate on residential capital. To keep the same tax 












Tax rate on residential capital income
31 
 
Figure 8: Welfare changes to tax on residential capital income when       and 
      
 
 
Figure 9: Welfare changes to tax on nonresidential capital income when       
and       
 
     
nonresidential capital. Again, the welfare change is greater when the tax rate on 
residential capital exceeds that on nonresidential capital. Welfare is 2.09% higher when 
the government taxes only residential capital than when the government taxes only 
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    Table 3a: Revenue equivalent welfare changes when       and       
     
    
    
        
      
        
       
      
        




2.42 2.09 0.97 0.81 0.86 
 
Table 4a: Revenue equivalent welfare changes to differential tax rates when 
      and       
Tax rates Welfare change Tax rates Welfare change 
        0.264 0.38             2.09 
             0.81         0.385 1.61 
              1.23               0.97 
              1.66                -1.45 
 
As for the other three cases, revenue equivalent welfare changes to alternative tax 
systems are shown in table 3b to table 4d. Throughout the three cases, equal tax rates on 
the two types of capital income are not optimal, differential tax rates can always achieve 
a higher welfare level. Another agreement is that welfare is higher when residential 
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Table 3b: Revenue equivalent welfare changes when       and       
     
    
    
        
      
        
        
      
        




2.86 1.24 0.70 0.54 0.59 
 
Table 4b: Revenue equivalent welfare changes to differential tax rates when 
      and       
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
        0.269 0.27             1.24 
        0.225 0.54               1.08 
              0.86               0.70 




    Table 3c: Revenue equivalent welfare changes when           
     
    
    
        
      
       
       
      
        









Table 4c: Revenue equivalent welfare changes to differential tax rates when 
          
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
              0.26             2.20 
              0.51               1.69 
              0.87               0.97 
              1.28                -1.33 
 
     Table 3d: Revenue equivalent welfare changes when                 
     
    
    
        
      
        
        
      
        




3.19 1.71 0.85 0.97 0.91 
 
 
Table 4d: Revenue equivalent welfare changes to differential tax rates when 
                
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
Tax rates Welfare changes 
(%) 
        0.251 0.51             1.71 
              0.97               1.42 
              1.37               0.85 




3.3 Discussion of the results 
A summary is made between the exogenous model and the endogenous model. Removing 
favorable tax treatment of owner occupied housing results in different effects in two 
models. Table 5 summarizes theses effects on the accumulation of capital, fertility, 
bequests, consumption, factor incomes and welfare. In table 5,    ,    ,      represent no 
effects, positive effects and negative effects respectively.  
Throughout all cases, capital intensity in the nonresidential sector increases while the 
stock of housing capital decreases, which is caused by a lower rate of return to housing 
capital when a tax on residential capital income is imposed. This also leads to increases in 
the price of housing service and the wage rate but a decrease in the rate of return to 
nonresidential capital. A higher relative price drives individual to consume more general 
goods rather than housing services.  
Fertility choices are different in different cases. Taxing two capitals equally would 
bring down fertility when young age housing service per person is at the minimum level 
(case 1 and 3). Otherwise, it would increase fertility. Bequests in all cases change in the 
opposite direction with fertility. The cost of housing services is a large component in the 
cost of children, which depends on both size and price of housing services. When young 
agents choose the housing services consumption larger than the required level, in face of 
an imposition of housing capital income tax, agents can always reduce the housing 
services consumed in period 1 to cut down the cost until reach the minimum level 
required. After that, the size of housing services cannot be reduced any more but the price 
is higher as the tax rate on housing capital income rises. Thus, fertility is positively 
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Table 5: The effects of eliminating favorable tax treatment of housing on steady 
state values 
 Exogenous  Endogenous  
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
            
            
  0         
b 0         
             
             
      0   0   
        0 0   
            
            
             
Welfare           
 
related to the tax rate on residential capital income when young age housing services is 
higher than the minimum requirement. But it is negatively related to the tax rate as long 
as young age housing services reaches the lowest level.  
Welfare also presents different changes in various cases. Welfare declines in the 
exogenous model. However, in the endogenous model, it improves when both of capitals 




This paper investigates the effects of the favorable tax provision of owner occupied 
housing. Changes of long run capital stock, consumption, the wage rate, the interest rate, 
fertility, bequests and welfare in different tax policies are measured. Both the exogenous 
fertility model and endogenous fertility model are simulated to make a comparison. 
Impacts on capital stock are the same in both models. Taxing residential capital income 
enhances capital per worker in the nonresidential sector but discourages the accumulation 
of housing capital. This in turn brings about a lower interest rate and a higher wage rate 
in nonresidential sector. Prices of housing services surge through the imposition of a tax 
on housing capital income.  
    Long run effects in the model with endogenous fertility are more complicated. With a 
minimum requirement of housing service, agents react to tax policy changes variously in 
different cases. There is a negative relationship between fertility and the tax on residential 
capital income when young age housing service per person is at the minimum level. 
However, the tax on residential capital income has a positive impact on fertility when 
young age housing service per person is not required at lowest level. Bequests in all cases 
change in the opposite direction with the fertility. According to the observation of 
realistic world, case 1 and 3 seem to be more plausible than the other two cases.  
    In the exogenous fertility model, a tax on residential capital income reduces welfare to 
some extent. In the endogenous fertility model, welfare improves only when both of 
young age and old age housing services per person are at minimum level. In terms of 
revenue equivalent changes, two results are consistent among all cases in either the 
exogenous or endogenous fertility model. Firstly, equal tax rates on two types of capital 
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are not optimal, higher welfare can always be achieved through choosing suitable 
differential tax rates. Secondly, welfare improves when residential capital income is 
taxed more heavily than nonresidential capital income.   
There are some limitations in the study. For example, all housing is assumed to be 
owner-occupied, and no consideration with respect to rental housing. It would be 
interesting to see the impact of housing tenure choice on the household fertility and 
bequest decision. The analysis is focus on the long run but not the dynamic transition. It 
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